Singer and Ma draw attention to a fascinating CCTV report from a few years ago that boasts of the dual-capable nature of a missile presumed to be the DF-26. This “pre-launch ambiguity” problem is very much a feature for the DF-26, however, and not a bug, per se (see a recent monograph on this topic by James Acton for more). government (certainly in the Trump administration) already view China’s No First Use declaration with skepticism. assumptions, especially as many in the U.S. Here, China’s stated posture of No First Use might have little to do in shaping U.S. With space-based early warning sensors able to notify the United States of a launch, planners may reason that such a launch could be a nuclear one. But conducting such an attack would amount to nuclear counterforce given that any given DF-26 launcher could play a role for nuclear retaliation by China.Ī separate scenario concerns China launching a conventional DF-26 during a conflict. It is currently the longest-range system in the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force explicitly designed for compatibility with conventional and nuclear payloads alike.Īs Singer and Ma note, this creates more than a few dangerous scenarios: for instance, in a conflict, the United States would be tempted to target DF-26 battalions to ensure that it could sustain operations into the Western Pacific and past the First Island Chain from its military facilities on Guam. territory of Guam, but for its dual capability.
The DF-26 is not only notable for being a system tailor-made for payload delivery to the U.S. Singer and Ma Xiu draw attention to China’s DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).
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